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Abstract
Experiences such as mind-wandering illustrate that cognition is not always tethered to events in the here-and-now. Although
converging evidence emphasises the default mode network (DMN) in mind-wandering, its precise contribution remains unclear.
The DMN comprises cortical regions that are maximally distant from primary sensory and motor cortex, a topological location
that may support the stimulus-independence of mind-wandering. The DMN is functionally heterogeneous, comprising regions
engaged by memory, social cognition and planning; processes relevant to mind-wandering content. Our study examined the re-
lationships between: (i) individual differences in resting-state DMN connectivity, (ii) performance on memory, social and plan-
ning tasks and (iii) variability in spontaneous thought, to investigate whether the DMN is critical to mind-wandering because it
supports stimulus-independent cognition, memory retrieval, or both. Individual variation in task performance modulated the
functional organization of the DMN: poor external engagement was linked to stronger coupling between medial and dorsal sub-
systems, while decoupling of the core from the cerebellum predicted reports of detailed memory retrieval. Both patterns pre-
dicted off-task future thoughts. Consistent with predictions from component process accounts of mind-wandering, our study
suggests a 2-fold involvement of the DMN: (i) it supports experiences that are unrelated to the environment through strong cou-
pling between its sub-systems; (ii) it allows memory representations to form the basis of conscious experience.
Key words: default mode network; resting state functional connectivity; perceptual decoupling; component process account;
mind-wandering
Introduction
Thoughts and feelings unrelated to the here-and-now occupy up
to half of waking thought (Klinger and Cox, 1987; Killingsworth
and Gilbert, 2010; Poerio et al., 2013). Despite their ubiquity, we
currently lack a clear understanding of how these complex every-
day experiences are produced. Our capacity for self-generated
thought allows us to think about people and places that are not
in the immediate environment, a process hypothesized to de-
pend on retrieving internally stored representations that capture
memories of past episodes and conceptual knowledge
(Smallwood et al., 2016). These unconstrained experiences can
have beneficial effects, including creativity (Baird et al., 2012;
Smeekens and Kane, 2016), the alleviation of loneliness (Poerio
et al., 2015, 2016a), psycho-social adaptation (Poerio et al., 2016b),
and the refinement of goals (Medea et al., 2016). Despite these
benefits of mind-wandering, the experience can also derail per-
formance on concurrent tasks (McVay and Kane, 2009).
Contemporary accounts of mind-wandering suggest that it
is best understood as the combination of different component
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processes (Smallwood, 2013a,b; Smallwood and Schooler, 2015).
One component is the decoupling of attention from perceptual
input that explains why mind-wandering is often linked with
poor performance on external tasks. This component process is
hypothesized to provide the mechanism that allows cognition
to become independent of events taking place in the external
environment. Support for the decoupling hypothesis comes
from empirical evidence showing that evoked responses to ex-
ternal input are reduced during mind-wandering (e.g. Baird
et al., 2014). Another key component process is the retrieval of
episodic and semantic knowledge which is thought to provide
the mnemonic representations upon which internal percep-
tually decoupled thought is based. In support of this, studies
have shown that the hippocampus, a region important in epi-
sodic memory, is: (i) active early during mind-wandering
(Ellamil et al., 2016) and (ii) shows a pattern of enhanced con-
nectivity with the medial pre-frontal cortex for participants
who engage in mental time travel during mind-wandering
(Karapanagiotidis et al., 2017). In combination, the processes of
perceptual decoupling and episodic memory retrieval are con-
sidered necessary conditions for the self-generation of a train of
thought unrelated to the external environment (Smallwood and
Schooler, 2015; Mittner et al., 2016).
Converging evidence suggest that mind-wandering is associ-
ated with a large-scale neural network known as the default mode
network (DMN) (Raichle et al., 2001; Weissman et al., 2006; Mason
et al., 2007; Christoff et al., 2009; Stawarczyk et al., 2011; Allen et al.,
2013). The DMN consists of cortical regions with the greatest geo-
desic distance from the input/output systems of the brain in visual
and motor cortex (Margulies et al., 2016). This topological location
may facilitate the expression of stimulus-independent aspects of
cognition that characterize mind-wandering because these re-
gions are thought to be less tethered to the input/output systems
of the cortex (Buckner and Krienen, 2013). The DMN is also impli-
cated in specific domains of cognition that are critical during
mind-wandering, including social cognition, semantic and epi-
sodic memory, and future planning (for meta-analyses see Spreng
et al., 2009; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014). As such, the DMN may
support the contents of experience when the mind wanders. In
line with this perspective, the DMN contains subsystems that re-
late to the two amodal long-term memory systems in the brain
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010a,b, 2014). First, the dorsal-medial sub-
system of the DMN encompasses regions of medial prefrontal and
anterior temporal cortex, regions implicated in the representation
and retrieval of conceptual knowledge of the world (e.g. Jackson
et al., 2016; Lambon Ralph et al., 2017). Second, the medial-
temporal subsystem involves regions of medial temporal lobe,
including the hippocampus, that are important in episodic mem-
ory (Moscovitch et al., 2016). Both of these subsystems, as well as
the DMN core, integrate information from multiple cortical re-
gions that contain modality-specific aspects of experience such as
regions that represent faces, places, words, actions, smells and
sounds (Horner et al., 2015; Patterson et al., 2007). Neural substrates
supporting episodic memory may bind such information into a
single representation, while substrates supporting semantic
memory may extract commonalities across experiences giving
rise to general knowledge. These representational codes may be
subsequently integrated into the core of the DMN based on its cap-
acity to echo neural responses from across the cortex (Leech et al.,
2011, 2012). Given that the DMN has been linked to both the cap-
acity to generate experiences that do not reflect the state of the
external world, and memory representation and retrieval, its con-
tribution to mind-wandering might reflect the decoupling of at-
tention from input/output systems during mind-wandering, the
availability of memory representations that reflect the contents of
our thoughts, or both.
The current study used an individual difference analysis to
delineate potential roles for the DMN in mind-wandering. Based
on evidence of spatial overlap between patterns of neural activ-
ity observed in both task based conditions (e.g. Smith et al.,
2009) and from studies providing evidence that individual dif-
ferences in brain organization at rest are associated with the
ability to perform a task mimicking those seen online during
task performance (e.g. Krieger-Redwood et al., 2016), we used
resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging to de-
scribe trait differences in neural organization and linked them
to trait differences in mind-wandering. We recruited 157 partici-
pants and measured their brains at rest on the first day of our
study. On three subsequent days we assessed the content and
form of their naturally occurring thoughts in the laboratory in
order to provide a relatively stable measure of trait-like mind-
wandering. Next, in a subset of 80 participants we measured
how they performed on a battery of tasks selected to measure
core cognitive processes linked to the DMN (including episodic
and semantic memory, planning and social cognition). We gen-
erated descriptions of the higher-order components underlying
(i) task performance (what we call ‘task components’—TC) and
(ii) self-reports produced using experience sampling of thoughts
(what we call ‘experience components’—EC). Next, we identified
‘neuro-cognitive components’ (NCs) by examining the relation-
ship between different features of task performance and pat-
terns of functional connectivity exhibited by the DMN. Finally,
we used these NCs to identify the brain–behavior relationships
predictive of the patterns of experiences that emerge during un-
constrained thought. In particular, we were interested in
whether brain–behavior–experience patterns highlighted a rela-
tionship to the potential contents of thought (e.g. patterns of
memory retrieval, social cognition or planning). Alternatively,
we might predict that brain–behavior–experience patterns
would relate more to the features that allow mind-wandering to
occur such as being internally focused or performing poorly on
tasks requiring external engagement (e.g. McVay and Kane,
2009), which would speak to the role of the DMN in stimulus-
independent features of mind-wandering. The rationale for this
experiment is summarized in Figure 1.
We were particularly interested in testing two features of
the component process account of mind-wandering. First, that
perceptual decoupling is an enabling condition that allows
memory processes to contribute to thought content during the
mind-wandering state (Smallwood 2013a,b). We therefore
examined whether individual differences in memory perform-
ance were related to mind-wandering and, if so, whether poor
performance on tasks requiring external attention would mod-
erate this relationship. Second, that key component processes
involved in the mind-wandering state (perceptual decoupling,
memory retrieval—revealed by our TCs) are anchored by neural
processes in the DMN. We expected that patterns of functional
connectivity of one or more subsystems of this large scale net-
work would be related to individual differences in mind-
wandering, memory retrieval, poor external engagement and/or
a combination of all three.
Materials and methods
Participants and procedure
One hundred and fifty-seven participants (60% female,
Mage¼ 20.43 s.d.¼ 2.63; range¼ 18–31) took part in an initial
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study where their resting-state brain activity and naturally
occurring thoughts in the laboratory were recorded. A sub-
sample of 80 then completed the subsequent task battery (64%
female; Mage¼ 20.29; s.d.¼ 2.26, range¼ 18–29). All participants
had a resting state scan prior to any laboratory testing and
underwent three days of testing during which we acquired
descriptions of their naturally occurring thoughts while per-
forming a simple non-demanding cognitive task. These meas-
urements took place at the beginning of each session after
which they completed a number of measures not relevant to
our current research questions. These participants were com-
pensated £80 or a commensurate amount of course credits. The
subset of 80 then took part in a laboratory session lasting 1.5 h
during which they completed the tasks described below in a
random order (with the exception of the non-social semantic re-
latedness task, which was part of a previous battery of tasks).
Participants also completed several questionnaires online prior
to the laboratory session, which are not relevant to the specific
research question addressed here. Participants were compen-
sated with £20 for their time or a commensurate amount of
course credits. Ethical approval was obtained from the
University of York Psychology Department and the York
Neuroimaging Centre and the research was conducted in ac-
cordance with the Helsinki Declaration.
Resting state MRI acquisition
Structural and functional data were acquired using a 3T GE HDx
Excite MRI scanner utilizing an eight-channel phased array
head coil (GE) tuned to 127.4 MHz, at the York Neuroimaging
Centre, University of York.
Structural MRI acquisition. Structural scans in all participants
were based on a T1-weighted 3D fast spoiled gradient echo se-
quence (TR¼ 7.8 s, TE¼minimum full, flip angle¼ 20, matrix
size¼ 256 256, 176 slices, voxel size¼ 1.13 1.13 1 mm3).
Functional MRI acquisition. Resting-state functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging activity was recorded from the whole brain
using single-shot 2D gradient-echo-planar imaging (TR¼ 3s,
TE¼minimum full, flip angle¼ 90, matrix size¼ 64 64, 60 sli-
ces, voxel size¼ 3 3 3 mm3, 180 volumes). Participants
viewed a fixation cross with eyes open for the durations of the
functional MRI resting state scan (9 min). A T1 weighted FLAIR
scan with the same orientation as the functional scans was col-
lected to improve co-registration between subject-specific
structural and functional scans (TR¼ 2560 ms, TE¼min full,
matrix size¼ 64 64, voxel size¼ 3 3 3 mm3).
Resting state pre-processing and first level analysis
Functional and structural data were pre-processed and ana-
lyzed using FMRIB’s Software Library (FSL version 4.1, www.
fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). Individual FLAIR and T1-weighted structural
brain images were extracted using Brain Extraction Tool.
Structural images were linearly registered to the MNI-152 tem-
plate using FMRIB’s Linear Image Registration Tool (FLIRT). The
resting state functional data were pre-processed and analyzed
using the FMRI Expert Analysis Tool (FEAT). The individual sub-
ject analysis involved: motion correction using MCFLIRT; slice-
timing correction using Fourier space time-series phase-shift-
ing; spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of FWHM 6 mm;
high-pass temporal filtering (Gaussian-weighted least-squares
straight line fitting, with sigma¼ 100 s); Gaussian low-pass tem-
poral filtering, with sigma¼ 2.8 s; six motion parameters (as
estimated by MCFLIRT) were regressed out; cerebrospinal fluid
and white matter signal were regressed out (top five PCA com-
ponents, CompCor method).
Studies have highlighted three DMN subsystems (Andrews-
Hanna et al., 2010b, 2014; Yeo et al., 2011): (i) the core of the net-
work is focused on medial regions in posterior cingulate cortex
and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), and the angular gyrus, (ii)
the dorsal-medial subsystem encompasses regions of dorsal
mPFC, anterior and lateral temporal cortex and ventral, anterior
prefrontal cortex, (iii) the medial-temporal subsystem engages
retrosplenial cortex, ventro-medial prefrontal cortex and para-
hippocampus. After preprocessing, we used the DMN maps
described by Yeo et al. (2011) to drive functional connectivity
analyses. We selected networks 15 (medial-temporal subsys-
tem), 16 (core subsystem) and 17 (dorsal-medial subsystem)
from the 17-network solution. The parcellations were obtained
in FreeSurfer surface space from http://www.freesurfer.net/
fswiki/CorticalParcellation_Yeo2011. After calculating the time
series for each of these networks, we performed a functional
connectivity analysis separately for each subject. The resulting
maps were compared at the group level using FMRIB’s Local
Fig. 1. Schematic description of the hypothesized relationship between latent neuro-cognitive components and both task performance and descriptions of experience.
TC, task component; NC, neuro-cognitive component; EC, experiential component.
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Analysis of Mixed Effects. These maps were thresholded at a
Z¼ 2.3 and whole brain cluster corrected P< 0.05 FWE. The re-
sulting positive and negative maps are presented in Figure 2
and the individual maps were used as the dependent variables
in a series of multiple regressions (see Results). To facilitate the
transparency of our analyses we uploaded all maps produced in
our study to a publicly available collection at Neurovault (http://
neurovault.org/collections/2115/).
Measures of experience
The contents of experience were measured using multi-dimen-
sional experience sampling (MDES) (Ruby et al., 2013a,b; Engert
et al., 2014; Medea et al., 2016; Smallwood et al., 2016). This tech-
nique uses experience sampling to periodically assess the con-
tent and form of a participant’s naturally occurring thoughts
and experiences. In this case, participants performed a simple
task that alternated in working memory load between a 0-back
condition and a 1-back condition (see Konishi et al., 2015).
Participants completed this task, which lasted 25 min, on
three separate occasions. We sampled experience on 3 days to
minimize potential state-related influences on this measure.
In both the 0-back and 1-back tasks, participants viewed dif-
ferent pair of shapes (non-targets) that appeared on screen sep-
arated by a vertical line. There were six possible shape pairings:
circle and square, circle and triangle, and square and triangle
(each with opposite left-right pairings). After a series of non-
target blocks, participants were presented with a target trial
requiring them to make a manual response (left or right arrow
button press). The target was a small shape in the middle of the
vertical line. In the 0-back condition, the target (e.g. a small
square in the middle of a vertical line) was flanked by one of
two shapes (e.g. a square on the left; a circle on the right) and
participants had to indicate via button press which shape
matched the target shape (e.g. left). In the 1-back condition, the
target was flanked by two question marks and participants had
to indicate which shape on the previous trial (i.e. 1-back)
matched the target. There were eight blocks—each consisting of
two to four mini-blocks containing either the 0- or 1-back condi-
tion. Each mini-block contained one target trial; the number of
preceding non-target trials varied between one and six.
Participants were informed of the change in condition (from 0
to 1-back and vice versa) by the presentation of the word
‘SWITCH’ that remained on-screen for 5 s. Stimuli presentation
rates were jittered: fixation cross presentations ranged from 1.3
to 1.7 s, non-target presentations ranged from 0.8 to 1.2 s and
target presentations ranged from 2.1 to 2.5 s.
Participants’ thoughts were sampled on a number of dimen-
sions using quasi-random thought probes that occurred during
the 0- and 1-back tasks. Participants received an average of 14.07
probes (s.d.¼ 3.30, Range: 6–25) during each session of the task.
Probes asked participants to report on the contents of their con-
scious experience in the moment immediately preceding the
interruption. Participants always rated their level of task focus
first (My thoughts were focused on the task I was performing)
from 0 (completely off-task) to 1 (completely on-task).
Participants then rated their thought at the moment before the
probe on a further 12 dimensions (described in Table 1) that cap-
tured core features of experience. All ratings were made on a slid-
ing scale from 0 to 1 and were answered in a random order. The
analyses we report in this paper focused on the experiences re-
gardless of the two tasks participants performed. We also looked
for task differences but found no evidence that the patterns re-
ported in this paper varied according to the demands of the task.
Fig. 2. Identifying the functional connectivity of different subsystems of the default mode network. Results of a functional connectivity analysis in which the three de-
fault mode network subsystems as defined by Yeo et al. (2011) were used as seed regions. These maps are thresholded at Z¼ 2.3 and are corrected for multiple compari-
sons at P<0.05 FWE. The maps in the gray sub panel reflect the networks that were used as the seed regions (dorsal medial¼blue; core¼yellow; medial
temporal¼green).
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Measures of memory and cognition
Tasks were selected to provide a broad coverage of aspects of
cognition and memory with an emphasis on elements of cogni-
tion that have been previously associated with mind-wandering
and the DMN: (i) autobiographical planning (e.g. Spreng et al.,
2010; Gerlach et al., 2014), (ii) social cognition (Amodio and Frith,
2006; Schilbach et al., 2008) and (iii) episodic and semantic mem-
ory retrieval (Binder et al., 2009; Spreng and Grady, 2010).
Autobiographical planning
Participants completed a version of the Means End Problem
Solving Test (Platt and Spivack, 1975). Participants were pre-
sented with six different social scenarios in a random order. For
each scenario they were provided with an initial situation
where a problem has to be solved (e.g. a person’s friends are
ignoring them) and a desired end point (e.g. the person’s friends
like him/her again). Participants were required to complete the
middle potion of each social scenario providing means whereby
the initial solution becomes the desired end point. For each
scenario participants were provided with 4 min to write about
the steps that they would take to solve the problem in each
scenario. Responses were coded according to (i) the number of
relevant means (i.e. the problem solving steps); (ii) the solution
effectiveness (defined as one that maximizes positive and min-
imizes negative short- and long-term consequences) (D’Zurilla
and Goldfried, 1971) which was rated from 1 (not at all effective)
to 7 (extremely effective) and (iii) the solution specificity (i.e. a
detailed and specific problem solution) which was rated from 1
(not at all specific) to 7 (extremely specific). Each problem solu-
tion was individual coded and scores for each domain (relevant
means, effectiveness, specificity) were averaged across each of
the six problems. A random 25% of the problem solutions were
second coded by an independent rater; inter-rater reliability
was calculated with intra-class correlation coefficient (two-way
random). The reliability coefficient was 0.73 for relevant means,
0.46 for effectiveness and 0.52 for specificity indicating fair to
good interrater reliability (Hallgren, 2012).1
The MEPs provides information on how individuals plan the
steps between from a starting social situation to desired end
goal. To provide a non-social control for the process of planning,
participants completed a computerized version of the Tower of
London task (see Spreng et al., 2010). For each problem, partici-
pants were presented with pictures depicting three rods of dif-
ferent heights and three colored discs. The tallest rod can hold
three discs, the middle rod can hold two discs and the shortest
rod can hold only one disc. In each problem, participants were
presented with two pictures: the bottom picture showed the
‘goal’ state (i.e. how the discs should be positioned on the rods);
the top picture showed the ‘initial’ state (i.e. how the discs are
currently positioned). Participants’ task was to mentally plan
the steps needed to reach the goal state from the initial state
and indicate the minimum number of moves that it would take,
with the conditions that discs can only be moved one at a time
and that only the top disc on a rod can be moved. Participants
viewed the goal state for 5 s and then the start configuration for
up to 15 s (or until they provided a response). Accuracy and reac-
tion time were used to create an efficiency score where higher
scores reflected fast and accurate responses.
Social cognition
We acquired behavioral measures of two aspects of social cog-
nition: mentalizing and theory of mind. To assess mentalizing,
participants completed a measure of perspective taking (Stiller
and Dunbar, 2007) in which they read five short stories of social
interactions involving a number of characters. After reading
each story twice participants were presented with 20 true/false
questions. Half the questions concerned facts about the story;
half required participants to correctly infer the mental states of
the story characters which differed in their levels of intentional-
ity (the most complex metalizing questions for example
involved tracking the mental states of all characters in the
story). Fact and metalizing questions were ordered randomly,
as were the order of the stories. Participants’ answers to each
question were weighted according to their level of complexity
(such that harder questions were given more weight) and then
averaged separately for fact and metalizing questions across
the five stories. Participants also completed the Reading the
mind in the eyes test, a theory of mind measure comprising
mental state attribution and complex emotion recognition
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2015). Participants were presented with 36
photographs of people’s eye areas, and, for each photograph,
they were instructed to select one metal state word (from four)
Table 1. Experience sampling questions used
Dimensions Questions 0 1
Focus My thoughts were focused on the task I was performing. Not at all Completely
Future My thoughts involved future events. Not at all Completely
Past My thoughts involved past events. Not at all Completely
Self My thoughts involved myself. Not at all Completely
Other My thoughts involved other people. Not at all Completely
Emotion The content of my thoughts was: Negative Positive
Images My thoughts were in the form of images. Not at all Completely
Words My thoughts were in the form of words. Not at all Completely
Vivid My thoughts were vivid as if I was there. Not at all Completely
Vague My thoughts were detailed and specific. Not at all Completely
Habit This thought has recurrent themes similar to those I have had before. Not at all Completely
Evolving My thoughts tended to evolve in a series of steps. Not at all Completely
Spontaneous My thoughts were: Spontaneous Deliberate
1 Due to the relatively lower reliability rates for the effectiveness and
specificity scores we re-ran the PCA analyses excluding these two
measures. We obtained three similar components with and without
these variables and the components from each analyses were highly
correlated, (component 1, r ¼ 0.95, p < 0.001, component 2, r ¼ 0.66, p
< 0.001, component 3 r ¼ 0.98, p < 0.001). Given these high correlations
we report analysis using the more comprehensive PCA in this paper.
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that best described what the person in the photograph is feeling
or thinking. Photographs and word choices were presented in a
random order and were displayed on screen until participants
responded or 20 s had elapsed (recorded as an incorrect re-
sponse). Accuracy and reaction time were used to create an effi-
ciency score where higher scores reflected fast and accurate
responses.
Memory
We assessed aspects of both semantic and episodic memory
since both of these have been implicated in the DMN (Binder
et al., 2009; Spreng and Grady, 2010). To index autobiographical
memory, participants completed an adapted version of the
Autobiographical Memory Interview (Madore et al., 2014).
Participants saw a random selection of six pictures (from a larger
set of 18) which were used as cues to recall an autobiographical
event from the past few years. Participants were instructed to de-
scribe a specific event in detail through their own eyes; they were
given 3 min to write down as much detail about each event.
Responses were scored using the adapted Autobiographical
Interview scoring manual (Addis et al., 2008). This scoring system
provided an individual score for each event regarding internal
event details (i.e. episodic details regarding the event including
place, time, sensory and mental state details related to the event)
and external event details (i.e. non-episodic details such as se-
mantic statements and repetitive or off-topic details); these were
averaged for each participant across each of the six descriptions.
Descriptions were also given a rating of episodic richness (Levine
et al., 2002) to index the extent to which a feeling of experiencing
of the event was conveyed; this was rated on a six-point scale. A
random 25% of the event descriptions were second coded by an
independent rater; inter-rater reliability was calculated with
intra-class correlation coefficient (two-way random). The reliabil-
ity coefficient was 0.89 for internal details, 0.86 for external de-
tails and 0.87 for episodic richness, indicating excellent interrater
reliability (Hallgren, 2012).
Participants also completed a semantic relatedness task to
provide an indication of semantic memory performance. Since
the DMN is also implicated in social cognition (see above) we
used a task in which both semantic and social relatedness judg-
ments were made. Participants were asked to determine the se-
mantic relatedness between a probe word and three alternative
choices only one of which was related in meaning to the probe.
Each trial started with 500 ms blank screen and the three
choices were then presented on the bottom of the screen for
900 ms. The probe was presented in the top middle section of
the screen. Probe and choices remained visible until partici-
pants responded or for a maximum of 3 s. In the non-social ver-
sion of this task that consisted of 60 probe words for objects
that were selected from a large database used in previous ex-
periments (e.g. Davey et al., 2015; Krieger-Redwood et al., 2015).
The social version of this task consisted of 30 positive and 30
negative words describing abstract social concepts (e.g.
impolite-tactless) adapted from Zahn et al. (2007). Accuracy and
reaction time were used to create an efficiency score where
higher scores reflected fast and accurate responses.
Results
Analytic aims
Our study aimed to understand the potential roles for the DMN
in mind-wandering. To this end, we first identified latent
components describing task performance and patterns of ex-
perience. Next, we conducted a series of resting-state functional
connectivity analyses to identify the neural patterns associated
with the DMN that described variation in task performance.
Having characterized latent components in brain, behavior and
experience, we examined if: (i) the experience components (EC)
could be explained by individual differences in task compo-
nents (TC) and (ii) if any of the patterns linking experience to be-
havior were also related to the neural components (NCs) that
reflect patterns of neural activity that the DMN exhibited at rest
that could be explained by measures of task performance.
Identifying components of task performance and
experience
We decomposed the task performance measures and measures
of experience using principal components analysis (PCA) to re-
veal latent variables that described these measurements. For
the task measures (Table 2 for descriptive statistics), the PCA
was conducted using the 12 measures resulting from the battery
of tasks administered. This revealed three task components
(TCs) with eigenvalues greater than one and with a clear elbow
after the third component observed in the scree plot. The three
orthogonal components accounted for 61% of the total variance
and varimax rotation produced component loading patterns
shown in Figure 3 and described below. We computed standar-
dized component scores for each of our three components for
each participant and used these as independent variables in the
subsequent analyses.
TC1—Detailed memory retrieval—accounted for 35% of the
overall variance and individuals with a high weighting on this
component produced more episodic details and richer descrip-
tions from autobiographical memory; they also performed effi-
ciently on tasks involving the retrieval of social and non-social
semantic associations. These individuals tended not to produce
generic semantic information in autobiographical memory re-
trieval. While they were stronger on average at recalling
autobiographical, social and semantic information, these par-
ticipants were not stronger on tasks that involved encoding and
planning (such as Tower of London) or encoding, understanding
and recalling stories (weaker fact and metalizing scores), sug-
gesting that this component did not correspond to the capacity
to encode ongoing events, or to memory ability in general, but
rather to the capacity to retrieve detailed and specific
information.
TC2—Social problem solving—accounted for 17% of the overall
variance and individuals with a high weighting on this compo-
nent performed well on all indices of social problem solving.
This capacity for problem-solving did not extend to a non-social
domain (Tower of London).
TC3—External engagement—accounted for 10% of the overall
variance and individuals with a high weighting on this compo-
nent performed well on the Tower of London task, and well on
both fact-based and metalizing questions about information
that was described in the social stories. Notably, these tasks dif-
fer from others in the battery because they rely to a much
greater extent on encoding information during the task (rather
than for example being able to rely on pre-existing knowledge
or experience). This component did not predict good perform-
ance on semantic or episodic retrieval tasks.
We decomposed the experience sampling data at the trial
level (for prior demonstrations of this approach see Ruby et al.,
2013a,b; Engert et al., 2014; Medea et al., 2016; Smallwood et al.,
2016). This revealed four experiential components (ECs) with a
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clear elbow after the fourth component observed in the scree
plot.
EC1—Immersive thoughts—accounted for 26% of the overall
variance and described thoughts that were detailed, evolving,
vivid and habitual.
EC2—Spontaneous off-task future thoughts—accounted for 19%
of the overall variance and described spontaneous off-task
thoughts involving the self, others, and future events.
EC3—Modality of thoughts—accounted for 10% of the overall
variance and distinguished visual from verbal thoughts.
EC4—Positive thoughts—accounted for 7% of the overall vari-
ance and described thoughts with a positive valence that were
not typically about past events.
We projected these components back into subject space by
averaging the loadings for each individual. This process
describes each individual in terms of how much their thoughts
represented each of the ECs. Heat maps describing the ECs are
presented in the gray panel in Figure 3. Of these solutions, two
(off-task thoughts focused on the future and the modality of
thoughts) replicate those observed in prior studies that used a
similar approach but a different set of questions (e.g. Medea
et al., 2016; Smallwood et al., 2016).
Identifying brain–task relationships
Having determined the latent components describing our par-
ticipants in terms of their task performance and experience, we
next characterized the relationship between the behavioral di-
mensions and the functional connectivity of different DMN sub-
systems. We conducted three separate group-level multiple
regressions in which individual loadings for each task compo-
nent were included as between-participant explanatory vari-
ables and whole brain connectivity maps for each DMN
subdivision at rest were the dependent variables. Automatic
outlier detection was applied to minimize the impact of ex-
treme scores in both neural and behavioral data. We examined
whole brain differences in the positive and negative connectiv-
ity of each DMN subdivision seed region. We used a cluster
forming threshold of Z¼ 2.3, and to minimize Type 1 error rates,
we set an alpha value of P< 0.008 FWE. This accounted for: (i)
the number of voxels in the brain, (ii) the two-tailed contrasts
(positive and negative connectivity) and (iii) the number of sep-
arate models (i.e. three—one for each DMN subsystem). Given
concerns that the cluster forming thresholds used in fMRI ana-
lyses are subject to Type I Errors (Eklund et al., 2016), we re-ran
these analyses using a more conservative threshold (Z¼ 2.6)
and all of the observed clusters were significant at this level at
the whole brain level (Table 3).
We found six NCs each reflecting modulation of either the
connectivity of the core and medial temporal systems of the
DMN by individual variation in one of the TCs. These are sum-
marized in Figure 4 and Table 3. Connectivity of the core DMN
(Yeo 16) revealed three significant clusters; one cluster in the
cerebellum extending into occipital fusiform cortex; another
Fig. 3. Identifying the components underlying task performance and experience. The results of decomposition of the multi-dimensional experience sampling data
(MDES) and the task battery to produce components of experience (EC) and components of task performance (TC). In both cases, we employed exploratory factor ana-
lysis and used varimax rotation. The number of solutions was selected based on the elbow from the scree plot. TC1¼detailed memory retrieval; TC2¼ social problem
solving; TC3¼external engagement; EC1¼ immersive thoughts; EC2¼ spontaneous off-task future thoughts; EC3¼modality of thoughts; EC4¼positive thoughts. EC,
experiential components; TC, task components; AM, autobiographical memory; SR, semantic retrieval; MEPS, means ends problem solving; TOL, tower of London; RME,
reading the mind in the eyes; TOM, theory of mind.
Table 2. Means and standard deviations of key task variables
Construct and variables M s.d.
Autobiographical planning
MEPS—number of relevant means 7.60 1.83
MEPS—effectiveness (rated 1–7) 5.01 0.85
MEPS—specificity (rated 1–7) 4.63 0.92
TOL (efficiency score—expressed
as reaction time)
44.96 74.58
Social cognition
Mentalizing (expressed as a proportion) 0.76 0.06
Social facts (expressed as a proportion) 0.85 0.07
RME (efficiency score—expressed
as reaction time)
6.57 2.29
Memory
AM—episodic details 20.95 5.36
AM—semantic details 2.37 1.67
AM—richness (rated 0–6) 3.81 0.82
Non-social SR (efficiency score—expressed
as reaction time)
1.76 0.32
Social SR (efficiency score—expressed
as reaction time)
2.76 0.62
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cluster in the inferior temporal gyrus and temporal fusiform
cortex and extending into the cerebellum, and the third other in
the lateral occipital cortex (in particular, the occipital fusiform
gyrus). The first two clusters showed a negative correlation with
TC1, indicating that high levels of detail in memory retrieval
was related to greater decoupling between these clusters and
core regions of the DMN. The third cluster in the fusiform cortex
showed a positive correlation with TC2, indicating that connect-
ivity of the core DMN with this cluster was higher for people
who were good at social problem solving.
Connectivity of the medial temporal DMN subsystem also
revealed three significant clusters: one cluster in anterior infer-
ior frontal gyrus another cluster in middle temporal gyrus, and
the third in superior frontal gyrus (including the dmPFC). These
clusters all showed a negative correlation with TC3, suggesting
that decoupling between these regions is associated with better
external engagement.
Relationships between task and experience components
Our analysis so far has described our sample in terms of compo-
nents representing descriptions of self-reported experience,
performance on the task battery, and the correspondence be-
tween task components and the organization of the DMN at
rest. Next, we used these components to understand how the
DMN contributes to mind-wandering by examining their associ-
ations across our sample.
We used a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to
identify whether, at the level of behavior, different combin-
ations of the latent variables describing task performance ac-
counted for the components of experience. In this analysis, the
ECs were the dependent variables and the TCs were the inde-
pendent variables; we examined the main effects of each TC on
experience components as well as fully modelling the inter-
actions between the TCs. Two significant interactions were
revealed by the MANOVA multivariate tests. First, an inter-
action between TC1 and TC3: F(4, 69)¼ 2.97, P¼0.025, g2p ¼ 0:15.
Subsequent tests of between-subjects effects showed that this
interaction was observed for off-task future thoughts (EC2), F(1,
80)¼ 4.95, P¼ 0.029, g2p ¼ 0:06). Individuals scoring below the me-
dian on TC3 (i.e. people who were less good at tasks with an
encoding element and who were therefore potentially less ex-
ternally engaged) showed a positive correlation between their
levels of detail in memory retrieval and spontaneous off-task
future thoughts (r¼ 0.39, P< 0.014) whereas individuals above
the median on TC3 did not (r¼0.19, P¼ 0.240). An interaction
between TC1 and TC3 was also observed for positive emotional
thoughts (EC4), F(1, 80)¼ 4.36, P¼ 0.041, g2p ¼ 0:06. Individuals
scoring above the median for TC1 (detailed memory retrieval)
showed a positive correlation between their levels of external
engagement (i.e. TC3 scores) and positive emotional thoughts
(r¼ 0.33, P¼ 0.038) whereas individuals below the median did
not (r¼0.19 P¼ 0.254).
Second, the MANOVA revealed an interaction between TC1
(detailed memory retrieval) and TC2 (social problem solving),
F(4, 69)¼ 2.81, P¼ 0.032, g2p ¼ 0:11. Subsequent tests of between-
subjects effects indicated that this interaction was observed for
positive emotional thinking, F(1, 80)¼ 8.55, P¼ 0.005, g2p ¼ 0:11.
Individuals scoring below the mean in detailed memory re-
trieval (TC1) showed a negative correlation between their levels
of social problem solving (TC2) and EC4 (positive emotional
thoughts; r¼0.54, P< 0.001) whereas individuals below the
median did not (r¼ 0.18, P¼ 0.271). These associations are sum-
marized in Figure 5.
Having demonstrated associations between latent variables
that underlie task performance and experience, we next tested
whether similar patterns would be reflected in the NCs. We
used the average parameter estimates that described the NCs
generated by our functional connectivity analyses as independ-
ent variables in a MANOVA with the four ECs components as
Table 3. Clusters showing a significant association between task components and functional connectivity of DMN subsystems at rest
DMN Seed Cognition component Cluster center of gravity Cluster size (voxels) Region P value
Detailed retrieval  12 92 24 2322 Cerebellum extending to the
occipital fusiform gyrus
0.000008*,†
48 72 28 1104 Cerebellum extending to the
inferior temporal gyms and
temporal fusiform cortex
0.00358*
48 24 34 731 Middle frontal gyrus 0.0345
Social problem solving þ 40 82 22 3117 Lateral occipital cortex
(occipital fusiform gyrus)
0.0000003†
34 82 28 696 Lateral occipital cortex 0.0433
Medial
Temporal
Detailed retrieval  46 70 44 766 Cerebellum 0.0294
Social problem solving þ 34 54 14 798 Frontal pole 0.0241
External engagement þ 4 82 44 875 Precuneus cortex 0.015
42 48 60 844 Superior parietal lobule 0.0181
External engagement  46 48 2 1809 Frontal pole 0.0001*,†
64 26 10 1286 Middle temporal gyrus 0.001*,†
2 48 36 1115 Superior frontal
gyrus / dorsal medial pFC
0.004*,†
52 40 4 711 Frontal pole 0.0417
Dorsal
Medial
External engagement  8 42 0 805 Cingulate gyrus 0.0239
Notes: The P-values represent the level of significance after correcting for the number of voxels in the brain. P-values marked with an asterisk identify regions that are
significant after correcting for multiple comparisons (P<0.008), the † identifies regions that are significant at P<0.008 when thresholding Z¼2.6.
AM, autobiographical memory; SR, semantic retrieval; MEPS, means ends problem solving; TOL, tower of London; RME, reading the mind in the eyes.
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the dependent variables. This analysis was based on the full
sample of 157 participants and revealed significant effects for
parameter estimates within two clusters for ECs: (i) the cluster
comprising the cerebellum extending to the inferior temporal
gyrus and temporal fusiform cortex (i.e. the second cluster pre-
sented on the left-hand side of Figure 4, and second cluster
described in Table 3) [F(4, 147)¼ 2.44, P¼ 0.050, g2p ¼ 0:06) and 2]
the cluster comprising the dmPFC [F(4, 147)¼ 2.50, P¼ 0.045,
g2p ¼ 0:06]. Tests of between-subjects effects showed that greater
decoupling between core DMN regions and the cluster compris-
ing the cerebellum was associated with more off-task future
thoughts, F(1, 150)¼ 8.18, P¼ 0.005, g2p ¼ 0:05. In contrast, greater
coupling between the medial-temporal DMN subsystem and the
dmPFC was associated with more off-task future thoughts, F(1,
150)¼ 4.68, P¼ 0.029, g2p ¼ 0:03. Together, these data show that,
consistent with the behavioral analysis, the patterns of
Fig. 4. Determining the neuro-cognitive components (NC) associated with task performance. Results of multiple regressions using the task components (TCs) as the in-
dependent variables and the functional connectivity of the core of default mode network (Yeo 16) and medial-temporal subsystem (Yeo 15) as the dependent variable.
These maps were created using a cluster forming threshold of Z¼2.3, and were corrected for the two tailed nature of our statistics, the number of models (3) and for
the number of voxels in the brain yielding an a level of P<0.008 FWE. The scatter plots reflect the relationships between the connectivity with the region indicated in
red and the relevant TC.
Fig. 5. Scatter plots showing interactions between task components predicting experience components (based on median splits).
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functional connectivity associated with both TC1 and TC3 (de-
tailed memory retrieval and external engagement, respectively)
both predicted the expression of off task future thoughts (these
relationships are summarized in Figure 6). We also observed
that more immersive self-generated thought (EC1) was linked to
greater functional coupling between the medial-temporal sub-
system and the dMPC, F(1, 150)¼ 4.09, P¼ 0.045, g2p ¼ 0:03, al-
though since we did not find an association between these
variables at the behavioral level we do not interpret this pattern
any further.
Finally, our analysis suggests that the pattern of poor task
engagement is associated with a pattern of functional coupling
at rest between the medial-temporal subsystem and regions of
inferior frontal cortex, dorsal-medial prefrontal cortex and lat-
eral temporal cortex. These regions are all elements of the
dorsal-medial DMN subsystem as defined by Yeo et al. (2011). To
quantify this similarity, we examined the spatial overlap be-
tween the pattern of functional coupling associated with task
disengagement and the functional coupling of the dorsal-
medial DMN subsystem (see Figure 7). This analysis reveals
that, almost without exception, the pattern of functional con-
nectivity from the medial-temporal subsystem that was associ-
ated with task disengagement falls within the connectivity
patterns of the dorsal-medial subsystem. This suggests that
enhanced communication between these two subsystems of
the DMN is linked to reduced capacity to perform tasks that rely
on external engagement.
Discussion
Our study set out to understand the contribution of the DMN
and component cognitive processes to self-generated
experiences that naturally occurred during an ongoing task. We
used PCA to identify cognitive components that underpin per-
formance on a battery of tasks which captured aspects of mem-
ory, social cognition and planning. We also identified patterns
of experiences reported while participants performed a simple
unrelated cognitive task, identifying a pattern of spontaneous
off-task future thoughts which correspond to a major element
of the mind-wandering state as measured in multiple studies,
and across a range of different cultures (Baird et al., 2011; Iijima
and Tanno, 2012; Song and Wang, 2012; Poerio et al., 2013; Ruby
et al., 2013a,b). Across individuals, different combinations of
task components explained cross-sectional variance in differ-
ent dimensions of experience. In particular, off-task future
thoughts were associated with a pattern of performance charac-
terized by poor external engagement combined with detailed
memory retrieval. We also found that these patterns of behav-
ioral covariance were mirrored by patterns of DMN connectivity.
Critically, off-task future thoughts were linked to greater cou-
pling between medial-temporal and dorsal-medial DMN
subsystems, a neural pattern that predicted poor external en-
gagement. Off-task future thoughts were also associated with
decoupling of the DMN core from regions of the cerebellum; a
neural pattern that predicted better performance on tasks
requiring detailed memory retrieval. These findings have a
number of important implications for understanding the role of
the DMN in unconstrained experiences, as well as for cognition
more generally.
First, our data provide convincing evidence in support of
component process accounts of the mind-wandering state.
These theoretical accounts propose that experiences such as
mind-wandering are not the consequence of a single process,
but emerge through the ‘interaction of discrete functional elem-
ents that serve specified cognitive processes’ (Smallwood,
Fig. 6. The relationship between the components underlying task performance, experience and the connectivity of the default mode network. Multivariate analysis of
variance demonstrated that two of the neuro-cognitive components (NCs) were associated with both components that underpin task performance (TC) and those that
explain the experience sampling data (ECs). The scatterplots present the correlations between task and brain and are based on 80 individuals (left), and between the
NCs and experience which are based on 157 individuals (right)—scores are residualized.
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2013b, p. 545). In particular, the process of attentional decou-
pling is hypothesized to lead to two consequences during mind-
wandering: (i) it explains the association between the occur-
rence of mind-wandering and poor performance on tasks
requiring external engagement and (ii) it allows cognition to
focus on information that is generated from memory without
retrieval being constrained by external input (Smallwood,
2013a; Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). Consistent with these
accounts, our functional connectivity analysis demonstrates
that the contributions of both attentional decoupling and mem-
ory retrieval to the mind-wandering state have unique neural
patterns. High levels of off-task future thoughts were independ-
ently associated with the patterns of cerebellar decoupling
linked to memory retrieval, and a pattern of within-DMN con-
nectivity was linked to poor external engagement. Moreover,
our behavioral analysis demonstrated that neither poor exter-
nal engagement, nor detailed memory retrieval, in isolation,
were predictive of individual differences in mind-wandering.
Instead, higher detail in memory retrieval was associated with
greater off-task future thoughts only in individuals who per-
formed poorly on tasks requiring external engagement.
Together, these patterns of dissociation at the level of brain and
behavior confirm two predictions of component process ac-
counts of the mind-wandering state: (i) that off-task future
thought is related to multiple dissociable NCs and (ii) that
decoupling provides a mechanism that allows memory retrieval
to contribute to the unconstrained experiences that occur dur-
ing mind-wandering.
Second, our findings suggest that the associations between
mind-wandering and poor external engagement depend on pat-
terns of integration within the DMN; specifically, a pattern of
heightened coupling between the dorsal-medial and medial-
temporal subsystems of the DMN. This pattern is consistent
with a prior study which found that the coupling between the
temporal pole (a region in the dorsal-medial subsystem) and
the core of the DMN was linked to individual variations in
greater off-task thought (e.g. Smallwood et al., 2016). Although
our data suggest a link between these aspects of the DMN
and poor external engagement, these regions have
well-documented connections with the cortical input streams
important for task performance. For example, regions of the
temporal lobe that are implicated in semantic memory have
been linked to both the DMN core and visual cortex via the ven-
tral visual stream (e.g. Binney et al., 2010; Visser et al., 2012);
similarly, retrosplenial cortex is linked to the DMN core and also
receives input from visual regions (e.g. Vann et al., 2009). These
dorsal-medial and medial-temporal subsystems of the DMN
network can, therefore, act in response to external input (during
encoding for episodic memory, and during object recognition
and verbal comprehension in the semantic domain). However,
our data suggest that they can also integrate information from
each other, and that when they do so they may create a pattern
of cortical organization that underpins the negative impact that
mind-wandering can have on external task performance.
Third, our results suggest that the DMN can contribute to a
range of different types of cognition by forming distinct modes
of connectivity that are distinguished by their location on the
principle gradient of connectivity (Margulies et al., 2016; see
Figure 7, middle). One mode of connectivity reflects integration
from regions of cortex specialized in unimodal representations
of information into the DMN. In our study, participants who
were better at identifying and sequencing steps to achieve a so-
cial goal showed stronger connectivity between the core of the
DMN and regions in the occipital lobe/fusiform gyrus. These re-
gions of cortex are close to the unimodal end of the principle
gradient (for an illustration see Figure 8) and are important in
the representation of people, places and scenes (Kanwisher and
Yovel, 2006; Martin, 2007; Grill-Spector and Weiner, 2014). This
pattern suggests that one type of functional behavior that the
DMN can exhibit at rest entails coupling with regions that are
Fig. 7. Poor external engagement corresponds to coupling between the medial-temporal and dorsal-medial DMN subsystems. Poor performance on tasks with a greater
reliance on external engagement is associated with coupling between medial-temporal and dorsal-medial subsystems of the DMN. The left- and right-hand columns
represents the unthresholded connectivity pattern for the medial-temporal and dorsal-medial subsystems, respectively. The spatial map in the middle column is
thresholded at Z¼2.3 P<0.05 FWE.
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more closely linked to the input stream of the cortex and hence
support forms of cognition that are ‘tethered’ to either percep-
tion or behaviour (Buckner and Krienen, 2013). This process of
integration may help to explain how the DMN can contribute to
situations when external input is important for cognition (e.g.
Konishi et al., 2015; Spreng et al., 2015; Vatansever et al., 2015).
Our data also suggest that the DMN can form patterns of cou-
pling that emphasize regions of cortex that are less connected
to perception or action. Participants who were worse at tasks
requiring external engagement exhibited the most coupling be-
tween regions located towards the heteromodal end of the func-
tional gradient, such as the anterior temporal lobe and the
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. This pattern was associated
with greater off-task future thoughts, indicating a potential role
for integration at heteromodal ends the gradient when cogni-
tive processes are reliant on memory generation such as during
mind-wandering or mental time travel (Mason et al., 2007;
Schacter and Addis, 2007; Christoff et al., 2009). Together these
patterns of connectivity suggest that the contribution of DMN to
different forms of cognition (e.g. those depending to a lesser or
greater extent on internal vs external information processing)
may emerge through the flexibility with which it can engage in
different modes of cortical integration. At present, this inter-
pretation is tentative because our data reflect individual differ-
ences in functional connectivity at rest rather than reliable
connectivity changes during active cognitive processing,
changes which may more accurately reflect responses to vari-
ations in the internal or external environment. Future research
might address our interpretation more directly by examining
the capacity of the DMN to flexibly change its patterns of con-
nectivity with different regions along the principle gradient dur-
ing task-based paradigms.
Our study focused on the role of the DMN in mind-
wandering in terms of its selection of seed regions, and many of
our whole brain results highlight regions that fall within the
broader DMN. These data confirm the important role that this
network plays in spontaneous states such as mind-wandering,
a conclusion supported by a number of previous individual dif-
ference studies (Bernhardt et al., 2014; Smallwood et al., 2016;
Karapanagiotidis et al., 2017) as well as the majority of online
experience sampling studies (Stawarczyk et al., 2011; Allen et al.,
2013; Tusche et al., 2014 although see Christoff et al., 2009). More
recent work suggests that mind-wandering also engages re-
gions outside the DMN, in particular regions important for the
executive network such as the dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex
(Fox et al., 2015; Christoff et al., 2016). These regions are thought
to be important at different times in the genesis of mind-
wandering (see for example, Ellamil et al., 2016) so it is possible
that our individual difference method of analysis is insensitive
to subtle temporal features of the experience emphasized by
these accounts. Alternatively, it may be that our experience
sampling battery fails to capture important aspects of the ex-
perience that these systems support. Consistent with this possi-
bility, recent work demonstrates that regions of the executive
system show stronger communication with regions of the DMN
for participants who engage in particularly deliberate forms of
mind-wandering (Golchert et al., 2017).
Finally, our study highlights a pattern of reduced coupling
between the core of the DMN and regions of lateral occipital cor-
tex/cerebellum that was linked to detailed memory retrieval, as
well as to spontaneous off-task future thinking. Although com-
ponent process accounts predict a close link between the func-
tional behavior of the DMN core during processes such as
episodic and semantic memory retrieval and states of off-task
thought, based on our current findings, it is difficult to deter-
mine the precise psychological meaning associated with these
patterns of neural coupling. Decoupling from the lateral occipi-
tal cortex may reflect a process of separation from input,
hypothesized to support better memory retrieval (Huijbers et al.,
2009). Previous research has also found spatial differences
within the cerebellum in terms of patterns of coupling with the
DMN for autobiographical memory retrieval (Addis et al., 2016).
In our study the cerebellar cluster falls within a regions showing
reduced connectivity with the DMN core (see the Neurovault
collection associated with this study). To fully understand the
role of decoupling from the cerebellum and the lateral occipital,
it will be necessary to record online neural data during both the
process of autobiographical memory retrieval, and during
mind-wandering, and examine how different features of these
states are related to common and distinct patterns of functional
decoupling between the DMN and these regions.
Although our findings provide important insights into how
the DMN contributes to mind-wandering, there are a number of
limitations that should be taken into account. First, to under-
stand the component processes of self-generated thought, our
study exploited individual differences in neurocognitive func-
tioning; that is, we examined relationships at the trait rather
than state level, relying on intrinsic rather than task based func-
tional connectivity. This approach is warranted since previous
research has shown that mind-wandering often shows similar
patterns of associations using either approach. For example,
similar trait and state results have been obtained in the domain
of event related potentials (e.g. Barron et al., 2011; Baird et al.,
2014) and mood (Smallwood and O’Connor, 2011; Poerio et al.,
2013, 2015). Other work also highlights the overlap between
task-based and intrinsic functional connectivity (Smith et al.,
2009; Krieger-Redwood et al., 2016). Nonetheless, there may be
patterns that our study cannot capture, so future work should
explore similarities between neural processing within the DMN
as it occurs during both task-related states such as memory re-
trieval as well as during off-task states such as mind-
wandering. Second, our decomposition failed to highlight a dis-
tinct component associated with social cognition. This may re-
flect our task selection or it may indicate the close association
between memory and social cognition that has been identified
by several meta-analyses of neuroimaging data (e.g. Spreng
et al., 2009). Given the potential social functions of mind wan-
dering (Poerio and Smallwood, 2016), future research might
profit from a closer examination of the role of social cognitive
processes in the mind-wandering state, using a more compre-
hensive battery of tasks that include measures of visual per-
spective taking (Surtees et al., 2013) and measures that
distinguish the self from others (Macrae et al., 2004). Finally, one
general concern with experience sampling studies is that the
act of measurement may alter the nature of the underlying
state, known as reactivity (e.g. Wheeler and Reis, 1991).
However, we collected resting state data before any of the ex-
perience sampling measures were recorded, ensuring that the
functional behavior of the DMN could not be affected by the act
of monitoring experience. Thus, our demonstration of the rela-
tionship at the level of brain, behavior and experience is un-
likely to be accounted for by the hypothesis that the pattern is a
consequence of thought monitoring (Konishi and Smallwood,
2016).
In summary, our study demonstrates a dissociable role of
the DMN in both decoupling and retrieval from memory, both
processes that are hypothesized to be important in the mind-
wandering state (Smallwood, 2013; Smallwood and Schooler,
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2015). Our study highlights patterns of heightened functional
communication between subsystems of the DMN that supports
disengagement of attention from the external environment,
and a pattern of cerebellar decoupling that affords greater detail
in memory retrieval. In combination, these patterns provide the
basis of a rich internal context that simultaneously takes ac-
count of episodic details from the past, and factual knowledge
of the world gained through experience and which allows de-
tailed retrieval of information from memory to be deployed on
information unrelated to an ongoing task.
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